

# Discount-based Pricing and Capacity Planning for EV Charging under Stochastic Demand

Parthe Pandit, Samuel Coogan

ECE  
UCLA  
parthepandit@ucla.edu


ECE, CEE  
Georgia Institute of Technology  
sam.coogan@gatech.edu

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# Motivation: Challenges due to widespread EV adoption


- Utilities need to plan capacity robust to load variability
- **Our focus:** *EV Charging Aggregators*
  - Buy from utility company, supply to EV users
  - For e.g. parking lots at airports, malls, and DC fast charging facilities etc.
- If an aggregator allows all users to charge at the fastest kW rate, Power capacity ( $K$ )  $\propto$  Space ( $M$ )  $\times$  Max charging rate ( $r_{\max}$ )
- For e.g.: UCLA would require  $20,000 \times 120 \text{ kW} = 2.4 \text{ GW}$
- **Problem:** Can we achieve a better scaling than the worst-case product above?
- **Solution:** Incentivise EV users to stay longer via *pricing*
- $\approx 10$  fold reduction for aggregator at the scale of UCLA

# Problem formulation




- Aggregator agrees with the utility not to exceed power usage by  $K$  (in kW)

# Problem formulation




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- Users demand  $x_i$  (kW-hr) and impatience  $\alpha_i$  (\$/hr),  $(x_i, \alpha_i) \sim f_{x,\alpha}$

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- Aggregator broadcasts parameters of pricing function
- Pricing function incentivizes users to provide longer service time deadlines


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- User  $i$  chooses their service time/deadline -  $u_i$  (in hr) based on the total cost

$$u_i = \underset{u \geq 0}{\operatorname{argmin}} \underbrace{P_{a,c,\tau}(x_i, u)}_{\text{Monetary cost}} + \underbrace{\alpha_i u}_{\text{Opportunity cost}}$$

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- **Note:** Aggregator could be distributed since sum of Poisson processes is a Poisson process


# Discount-based pricing function

- Desired properties from  $P(x, \cdot)$  to incentivise longer deadlines  $u_i$ 
  - **Decreasing:** Users pay lower price for longer service times
  - E.g. Patient users (i.e. lower  $\alpha_i$ , longer  $u_i$ ) get more discount
  - **Convex:** Discounts are diminishing as service time increases
- We consider the following pricing function
- For charging an EV by  $x$  kW-hr in time  $u$  hr is,

$$P_{a,c,\tau}(x, u) = x(ae^{-u/\tau} + c)$$



# Discount-based pricing function



Interpreting the parameters:

$$P(x, u) = x(ae^{-u/\tau} + c)$$

- $c$  - Base price (\$/kW-hr),
- $a$  - Surge price (\$/kW-hr)
- $\tau$  - Suggested service time (hr)

- Service time decision by user  $i$  to minimize total cost,

$$u_i = \tau \cdot \log \left( \frac{ax_i}{\tau \alpha_i} \right)$$

- \$ amount paid by user  $i$  with demand  $x_i$  and impatience  $\alpha_i$

$$P_{a,c,\tau}(x_i, u_i) = cx_i + \tau \alpha_i$$

# Capacity planning under stochastic demand

- Let  $f_{x,\alpha}$  be such that  $\mathbb{E}u = b\tau$ ,  $\mathbb{E}\left(\frac{x}{u}\right) = \frac{\mu}{\tau}$  and  $\text{Var}\left(\frac{x}{u}\right) = \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{\nu}{\tau}\right)^2$
- Let the maximum rate of charging a *single* EV be  $r_{\max}$  (in kW)

Theorem (Space and Power Capacity, for constant power charging)

For an arrival rate of  $\lambda$ , at any time, with 99% confidence, we have

- 1 Demand for space will not exceed

$$M = \lambda b\tau + \sqrt{5\lambda b\tau} + 3$$

- 2 Power delivered will not exceed


$$K = \lambda b\mu + (\mu + \nu)\sqrt{6\lambda b/\tau} + 6r_{\max}$$

- Similar to  $Y \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$ , then with 99% confidence,  $Y \leq \mu + 3\sigma$ .
- $K \propto \mathcal{O}(M + r_{\max})$  instead of  $K \propto \mathcal{O}(M \times r_{\max})$
- Optimal rate with respect to  $\lambda$ . A lower bound of  $K = \Omega(\lambda)$  exists.
- **Tradeoff:** Space capacity  $M = \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\tau)$ . Power capacity  $K = \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/\sqrt{\tau})$ .

# Numerical simulations - Excess capacity $v/s \lambda$

$$\text{Excess capacity} \propto \frac{1}{\sqrt{\lambda}}$$

Excess :=  $\frac{\text{Theorem} - \text{Actual}}{\text{Actual}} \times 100$ . For 100 simulations of 8 hr each.



# Numerical simulations - Capacity v/s Confidence

Excess capacity  $\propto \frac{\log(\frac{1}{\delta})}{\sqrt{\lambda}}$  for  $1 - \delta$  confidence

Excess =  $\frac{\text{Theorem} - \text{Actual}}{\text{Actual}} \times 100$ . For 100 simulations of 8 hr each.




Figure:  $\mathcal{N}^\delta$  is the  $1 - \delta$  percentile of occupied space,  $\mathcal{Q}^\delta$  is the  $1 - \delta$  percentile of power delivery.

# Summary

- Pricing can help incite some desired behaviour in *impatient* users
- Probabilistic constraints allow reducing installation capacity drastically from  $K \propto \mathcal{O}(M \times r_{\max})$  to  $K \propto \mathcal{O}(M + r_{\max})$ 
  - Example:  $\approx 10$  fold reduction for UCLA.
- We characterized probability of failure that helps plan for back-up capacity (battery banks/generators)
- Other aggregators with impatient users
  - *Cloud computing*: Client machines upload FLOPS to a server with a deadline for the computation. Users get discounts for waiting longer.
  - *Cab aggregators*: Users get a discount for waiting longer (Uber Pool or Lyft Line), allowing for more efficient resource allocation by aggregator.

Thank You!